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Abstract- 
 Due to high restrictions in sensor network, where the resources are limited, clustering protocols for 
routing organization have been proposed in much research for increasing system throughput, decreasing 
system delay and saving energy. Even these algorithms have proposed some levels of security, but 
because of their dynamic nature of communication, most of their security solutions are not suitable. In 
this paper we focus on how to apply the highest possible level of security to sensor networks and at the 
same time increase the performance of these networks by changing the way that sensors communicate 
with each other. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure1. Cluster organization for sensor networks 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There are many advantages of using sensor networks. They provide dynamic and wireless 
communication between nodes in a network, which provides more flexible communications. At the same 
time, sensor networks have some special characteristics compared to traditional networks, which makes it 
hard to deal with this kind of networks. The most important property that affects this type of network is 
the limitation of the resources available, especially the energy.  
 
Sensor networks are self organized networks, which makes them suitable for dangerous and harmful 
situations. At the same time makes them easy targets for attack. It is important to apply some level of 
security so that it will be difficult to be attacked, especially when they are used in critical applications [1]. 
 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) [2] are special kinds of Ad hoc networks that became one of the 
most interesting areas for researchers. Routing techniques are the most important issue for kind of 
network where resources are limited. Cluster-based organization has been proposed to provide an efficient 
way to save energy during communication [3]. In this kind of organization, nodes are organized into 
clusters. Cluster heads (CHs) pass messages between groups of nodes (group for each CH) and the base 
station (BS), (Figure1). This organization provides some energy saving which is the main advantage for 
proposing this organization. Depending on this organization, LEACH (Low Energy Adaptive Clustering 
Hierarchy) [3] enhanced security, where the CHs are rotating from node to node in the network making it 
harder for intruders to know the routing elements and attack them. [4]  
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There are some existing works to improve the security of LEACH. Recent techniques provide 
efficient security to pairwise node-to-CH communication [5]. In [5], a modified version of LEACH that 
inherits its security from random key distribution was proposed. 
     
In this paper, we discuss some existing work of LEACH and we focus on two important criteria; the 
performance and the security. In section two, we discuss the original work of LEACH, and then in the 
third section we discuss two of the most interesting modifications proposed for LEACH to increase 
performance and security. In the fourth section we discuss the security and performance of LEACH, and 
propose modification to increase the performance, and to improve the security. In section 5, we evaluate 
performance and security of our solution compared to other solutions. 
 
2. LEACH protocol 
 
LEACH was first proposed to reduce total energy consumption in sensor networks [3]. It is assumed 
that every node can directly communicate with a BS using a high enough transmitting power. By 
providing a clustered hierarchy, we can balance the energy consumption. Sensor nodes send their 
messages to specific nodes and they will be considered as cluster heads (CHs). CHs then aggregate these 
messages and send them to the BS. We can notice that this process results in energy saving for nodes that 
are not involved in CHs since they can transmit now with less transmission power, but at the same time 
we consume the energy of CHs. To solve this problem, LEACH proposed a dynamic CH rotation which 
concluded that the CHs should change at each round. Every round, a new node will become a CH. The 
network chooses CHs using a distributed algorithm and then dynamically clustering the remaining nodes 
around CHs. 
 
2.1 Description 
 
LEACH is working in rounds. We will summarize the steps for a single round in the remaining part of 
this section.  
 
According to oliveria et.al, each round consists of two main phases; the setup phase (initial phase) 
and the steady state phase (real transmission phase) [5]. For the setup phase, each node decides the 
probability that it can be a CH for the current round, considering the energy and the knowledge of the 
desired percentage of CHs. Let us call these Ready Nodes RNs. RNs broadcast advertising messages for 
the whole network. When the nodes receive all advertising messages, the remaining nodes will choose a 
CH depending on the highest signals received from RNs and then each of these nodes will send a message 
to the desired CH requesting to join it. When the CHs receive the messages, they start to broadcast the 
confirmation for these accepted nodes by sending confirmation messages with a time slot schedule for 
each node in the group. This time slot tells each node in that group when it is time to transmit its 
messages. 
 
The second phase concerns the transmission of the real data among the network. According to the 
time schedule  provided by CHs to other nodes, each will start sending its data to the proper CHs. CHs 
then will collect the messages from their members, analyze and handle them, then send the results to the 
BS. 
 
2.2 Security in LEACH 
 
Jamming and spoofing are kinds of attacks that could be harmful to sensor networks. In LEACH, the 
nature of clustered distribution can lead to a harmful attack, especially when that attack relies on CHs for 
sending and receiving data. If a hacker decides to become a CH, this can result in a disrupted network. 
Selective forwarding and sinkhole attacks are examples of these kinds of attacks [5]. 
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In LEACH, the possibility for the network to be attacked by these kinds of attacks is very small 
because CHs are changing in each round of communication. It is hard for the intruders to know the 
expected CHs for each round so that they can disrupt the critical points of the network. 
 
3. Improving LEACH 
   
By analyzing the work of LEACH we can determine the critical points of communication, and then 
we can focus on providing more efficient security at those points. One point is to determine CHs in a way 
that it will be hard for the intruder to guess which nodes will be CHs.  
 
The easiest and the most efficient way is to prevent suspicious nodes from participating in the 
network, and this step should be taken at the time of network setup.  
 
By providing a secure way to prevent illegitimate nodes from participating in the network we can 
reach a good level of security and we can reduce the future work load of the network to provide security. 
Some studies propose controlling access to the network for sensor networks, and most of these works are 
based on key distribution (KD) for cryptographic mechanisms. 
 
3.1 Existing work on LEACH 
 
As we mentioned earlier, there are many techniques proposed as new modifications for LEACH to 
provide more security and to reduce energy consumption. In this section we will discuss two of these 
works and then we will propose some modifications for these works.   
 
3.1.1 F_LEACH 
  
F-LEACH [6] is an enhanced version of LEACH that gives protection for the network. It suggests 
that each node has to have two symmetric keys: a pairwise key shared with the BS and the last key chain 
held by the BS. According to that, it suggested small modifications for LEACH. For the setup phase, the 
message sent by RNs should consist of an encrypted message that contains the ID of the node that should 
receive the message and the ID of CH itself as plain text, and the encryption (ID of CH, the counter shred 
by CH and the BS, and the advertisement message) using the message authentication code (MAC) that is 
produced using the shared key between CH and the BS.  
 
The nodes hold the IDs of the CHs. At the same time the BS will analyze the messages sent by CHs 
to authorize them. Any valid CH will then have its ID added to the list of valid nodes IDs. After that, the 
BS broadcasts the list with the encrypted list for all nodes in the network using µTESLA [7] broadcast 
authentication scheme. Now the nodes can recognize the authenticated RNs to be connected with, so these 
nodes send their requests to participate with CHs groups. CHs then broadcasts confirmation messages for 
approved nodes. Each message will contain the time slot schedule for each node. 
 
It can be noticed that F_LEACH does not provide full authentication for node-CH where the 
messages to be sent from the nodes to CH are not authenticated. 
 
Oliveria et.al proposed another solution to provide some ways to redistribute the keys using random 
key redistribution for securing node-CH communication in LEACH [5]. 
 
3.1.2 SecLEACH- Random KD to LEACH 
 
SecLEACH [5] proposes improvements to LEACH protocol. It shows how to invest the key 
redistribution scheme to secure node-to-CH communications. The main idea is to generate a large pool of 
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keys and their IDs at the time the network is deployed, and then each node is assigned a group of these 
keys randomly. Also, each node is assigned a pairwise key which it shares with the BS. 
 
In setup phase, each CH includes the IDs of the keys in its key group, and a nonce in its advertising 
message offering its availability to become a CH. The ordinary nodes also choose an ID that is shared 
with CH. Then each of these ordinary nodes sends the message to CH requesting to join its group.   
 
The message includes the ID of the node, ID of CH, r, join_ request message, and the encryption 
(node ID, CH ID, r and the nonce sent by CH) using MAC that is produced using a symmetric key 
associated with r. Each CH then sends a confirmation message to approved nodes containing the ID of 
CH and a group of pairs (ID and time slot for each node to start transmission).  
 
In steady state phase, the nodes transmit the messages to CHs according to the time slot provided 
before, and each message includes the ID of the node, the ID of desired CH, sensing report from the node, 
and the encryption (node ID, CH ID, node sensing report and the nonce+ reporting cycle within the 
current node) using the same MAC used before. Finally, CH starts sending the final data for the BS, and 
the message includes the ID of CH, the ID of BS, the aggregation data from all nodes, and the encryption 
(the aggregation data and the ID of CH) using the MAC produced from the ID of CH. 
 
This algorithm provides authenticity, confidentiality, and freshness for node-to-node communication. 
The security level is not impacted by the number of nodes; actually it depends on the size of the key 
group assigned for each node according to the total size of the key pool [5]. 
 
4. ModLEACH  Performance and Security 
 
In this section we first discuss the main weakness points for the previous work according to the 
performance and security, then we show how to improve the performance, and finally we propose some 
modifications to security proposed by LEACH. 
 
4.1 Security and Performance in LEACH 
 
F_LEATCH does not manage to provide a complete and efficient solution for node-to-CH 
authentication [6]. In SecLEACH, this problem has been solved in an efficient way, but most of the work 
has to be controlled by the BS which will cost more than what is expected according to [8]. Data overload 
has also increased compared to original LEACH. 
 
LEACH itself is a smart way of work organization in sensor networks, but the problem here is how to 
determine the elected CH each round in the network. As we can see from previous description of 
LEACH, most of these decisions have to be made by the BS. 
 
4.2 Improving Performance 
 
We can improve the performance of LEACH and its related works by changing the way to elect CH. 
We propose a simple way to rotate the CHs from round to round. 
 
Instead of building the clusters directly by sending an advertised message and receiving a join request 
message, the nodes start broadcasting directly to direct neighbors, then a node with high enough power 
broadcasts an acknowledgment to desired nodes with their time slot schedule. The first acknowledgment 
received indicates the first possible CH, then after the node checks the validity of this CH using some 
security techniques, it elects this node as its CH, and it discards any other messages received from other 
nodes. 
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Routing to the most direct neighbors decreases the energy required for transmission, since the 
distance becomes less. Also the number of messages needed to build the clustered network is less. The 
node, just for each round, sends its first real message to the next neighbors. After receiving the 
acknowledgment from the first RN, it will consider this node as CH and start to broadcast the rest of the 
messages through this CH to the BS. Then, by default, after each round the energy in these CHs will be 
less than before, so they will not be ready nodes in most cases. New nodes will take the leadership after 
each round. 
 
4.3 Improving Security 
 
Security is handled very well in SecLEACH. In our protocol we use the same keys that were 
proposed by SecLEACH as follows: SecLEACH suggests generating a large pool of keys and their IDs 
due to the deployment of the network. Each node has to be assigned by a group of keys (m) by using a 
pseudorandom function to provide the node ID which will be used to generate a sequence of keys ID that 
will be assigned to that node. Also at the time of network deployment, each node has to be assigned by a 
pairwise key shared with B.S. (this key will be used for verifying the aggregate messages sent by CHs).  
 
4.4 ModLEACH protocol 
  
The main modification for LEACH is to change the way that the CHs are elected and to change in 
advance the way that the nodes and CHs communicate. 
 
After generating the key pool and assigning the groups of keys for each node, in addition to a 
pairwise key for each of them, we can start our protocol. First, each node that needs to send data to base 
station starts sending the first message from its sequence of messages. The main idea here is to try join the 
nearest nodes considering them as possible CHs for the current round (by this step we can skip the setup 
phase proposed by LEACH and other related protocols). The nodes broadcast their first packet. The 
packet includes necessary information: TTL (Time to Live), node ID, ID of common key used in 
encryption (CK ID), the tag number TG=1 (1-bit number / 0 for join request, 1 for approval), the status 
number ST=0 (1-bit number /0 for first packet send, 1 otherwise). All this information is encrypted using 
MAC that produced using the common key mentioned before. Also the packet contains the plain text of 
node ID, the tag number, and the status number. Next the node will wait for enough time to see if there is 
any response. TTL is set to one so that only the direct neighbors will receive the packet [9]. All direct 
neighbors will receive the packet. Each node checks the TG and ST numbers; if TG is zero and ST is zero 
then that means the node is requesting from the reception to become its CH. If the node has enough power 
then it can reply to the nodes that sent the packets to join the group of CH. Then for each packet RN 
receives, it will store the node ID in a possible member table with a sign that it is not approved yet and 
sends a confirmation packet to all accepted nodes that includes: TTL, TG=1, ST=0, RN ID, and node IDs 
all encrypted using MAC that is produced using the common key for CH which is shared between it and 
the desired node. According to Eschenauer and Gilgor, any two sensors can be assured to have one 
sharing key at least if the number of common keys is reasonable [10]. In addition to that information, the 
RN ID, CK ID, and the tag are also included in the packet as a plain text. When the desired node receives 
the confirmation packet, it will check as before for the tag number; if its zero, then it is a request to 
become CH. In this case the previous step will be repeated. Otherwise it is a confirmation; in this case it 
will process the packet to check the validity of the CH. If it is valid, it will start sending the rest of the 
packets for the elected CH. The parameters for next packets are like before, with the sensing report, 
TG=0, ST=1. When CH receives the message with those parameters values, it will be as an approval for it 
to become a CH, where at least one node has to approve RN to be a CH, and it will change the status of 
the node in its member table to be approved. So it will start collecting the packets from each node in 
member table. Then it will aggregate these data in one message and start sending it to the BS. Each packet 
sent from CHs to the BS includes: the ID of CH, the ID of B.S, the aggregation of data, and the 
 
6
encryption (data aggregation and CH ID) using the MAC address using the associated symmetric key 
associated with CH ID. This one is shared with the BS which allows the BS to verify the validity of the 
CH and the message. 
 
In this scenario, a case of no available direct neighbor to be a CH is possible but this possibility will 
be small, since each node send to its direct neighbor. If this case happens, then there are two available 
solutions: first, the node can retransmit the first packet with increasing the value of TTL to two. This will 
produce wider range of direct neighbors than before. The second solution is the rest of nodes that dont 
have CH to follow, may send directly to the BS. We preferred the second solution, because the first 
solution has another possibility: at the time the nodes send another request, all CHs can be reserved. 
Another reason is it that will increase the risk that some intruders can be involved in this request, which at 
least will result in delay of transmission. 
 
5. Evaluation and Analysis 
 
Since we built our solution on the same ideas followed by SecLEACH, which is mainly using KD, we 
will start for each part of this section by showing the results provided by [5, 10]. We will provide the 
mathematical model that shows improvement offered by our solution. 
 
5.1 Performance Evaluation 
  
In Wireless Sensor Network (WSN), there is a fixed space for each node to store the key group 
selected from the key pool. This means that the size of the group (GS) is fixed at the first time the 
network is built. After GS is determined, the size of the key pool (PS) will affect the network in two ways 
 
1. Level of security: 
Depending on the variable names provided before, the security level is given by [5] 
 
Security level= 1- GS/PS 
 
This means: increasing the PS will provide us with higher level of security. 
  
2. Sharing keys probability: 
The probability of two nodes not to share the key is given by the formula [5] 
 
P= [(PS-GS)!]2 / PS!*(PS-2GS)! 
  
This means that the probability for two nodes to share the key is increased by increasing the size of 
the key pool. 
 
Since we used the same technique to generate the key pool and to provide the key groups, then the 
issue of key sharing technique will get the same performance proposed by SecLEACH. 
 
Because all CHs use the same single hop to communicate with the B.S, then increasing the number of 
CH will lead to more power consumption. In our solution we followed the KD scheme used by 
SecLEACH to produce the sharing keys, and as we mentioned before, increasing the size of the pool will 
decrease the number of CH produced, where only the nodes that received the first packet and share the 
same key can then proceed with the communication. On the other hand, decreasing the number of CH 
may results in increasing the number of nodes that joined the CHs. 
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Providing a suitable size of key pool leads to suitable level of security with high performance, see 
(Figure2). 
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Figure2. Security level affected by key pool size and the keys group size, m represents the size of each group. 
 
Overload and number of messages needed to provide a complete round are not taken as important 
issues in LEACH, SecLEACH and FLEACH, even as it approved in the study by Eschenauer and Gligor 
that in general, the cost of data transmission is more than data processing [10], and since the overload of 
the packets could affect the transmission in order to waste more energy, we proposed our solution.  
 
Our solution proposes one phase that combines the setup and steady phases together. First the node 
sends the requesting packet to the RN with some extra bits, which are even less than the real packet sent 
from the node to CH in pervious LEACH protocols. Then the RN will check the variables in the packet to 
determine the type of this packet. According to its type it responds by replying to the nodes and storing 
the ID of the node as an expected member at the same time. Then RNs send messages to indicate that they 
are ready to be CHs with time slots for each node. Nodes then reply to CHs by the real message including 
the sensing report, then CHs will send the aggregated data from their member, and it will send it to the 
proper BS.  
 
5.2 Security evaluation 
 
As it discussed in [5], ModLEACH that follows the same techniques that proposed by SecLEACH for 
security. The level of security to prevent the node capture by intruders is determined by the security level 
of the network. Using KD scheme, the size of the key pool determines the level of security provided by 
my solution. Increasing the size of the key pool increases the level of security.   
 
6. Conclusions 
  
The advantage of using clustered organization is the total energy consumption. LEACH is one of the 
best schemes that applied this kind of organization, where it provides a dynamic rotating of clusters heads 
at each round. Some security solutions have been proposed for LEACH to improve the security level in 
such scheme. The overload is not considered carefully in these improvements. In our proposed we 
decrease the overload, improve security, and decrease the number of transmissions needed to complete 
the communication. 
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